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THE DOORS ARE LOCKED BUT THE
THIEVES AND VANDALS ARE
STILL GETTING IN: A
PROPOSAL IN TORT TO
ALLEVIATE CORPORATE AMERICA'S
CYBER-CRIME PROBLEM
I. INTRODUCTION
Twas the [night] before Christmas, and the employees of XYZ Corp.
were logging off a successful year with holiday parties at company headquarters in New York City. Meanwhile, inside their locked, darkened
offices, not a creature was stirring, not even a computer mouse-or so
they thought. Unbeknownst to the merrymakers, a team of professional
to inhackers in Texas [from WheelGroup Corporation] was preparing
1
vade XYZ's [computer] systems from 1,600 miles away.
A few months earlier, an executive from WheelGroup had boasted to
Fortune Magazine that they had yet to find a network they could not
penetrate electronically. 2 "It's really very easy to do ....

If it's a big

network, it may take us an evening. Otherwise it may take two hours,"3
the executive boasted. Fortune took this boast as a challenge and found
1. Richard Behar, Who's Reading Your E-mail?, FORTUNE, Feb. 3, 1997, at 57. This
scenario is based on a true story. Id. XYZ Corporation is a fictitious name as the real
Fortune 500 corporation requested anonymity. Id. at 58. The hackers in this story are
from WheelGroup Corp., a San Antonio computer security firm that conducts "external assignments" as a diagnostic service for clients. Id. at 57.
2. Behar, supra note 1, at 57-58.
3. Behar, supra note 1, at 58. For further illustration, see Noted & Notorious Hacker
Feats, BYTE, Sept. 1995, at 151. On February 15, 1995, the FBI finally arrested Kevin D.
Mitnick, who had been on the run since 1992. Id. In 1989, Mitnick was convicted and
sentenced to three years probation for breaking into Digital Equipment Corporation's computer network system and stealing its software. Id. Since his 1989 conviction, Mitnick has
allegedly broken into a California motor vehicles database, stolen 20,000 credit card account numbers from an on-line service, gained control of New York and California telephone switching hubs via modem, eavesdropped on telephone calls, mutated home
telephones into quarter-demanding pay phones, and stored data that he had stolen from
other networks. Id. Mitnick states, "I know the computer systems of the world are not as
safe as they think .... Information is not safe. Only military computers are secure." Mitnick Confesses: 'No One is Secure!," DATAMATION, Jan. 15, 1996, at 8.
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a respected "Fortune 500 "4 company willing to take on the challenge
6
with WheelGroup. 5 This challenge was dubbed "Operation Nutcracker"
4. The Fortune 500 Largest U.S. Corporations,FORTUNE, Apr. 29, 1996, at Fl. A company on this list is one of the 500 largest companies in the United States based on annual
revenues. Id.
5. Behar, supra note 1, at 58.
6. Behar, supra note 1, at 57-61. This fascinating story is as follows: First, the hackers needed to find out how to link up with XYZ. Id. at 58. Fortunately, all they had to do
was access via the Internet the Network Information Center ("NIC"), a public registry of all
computer domain names. Id. If a company doesn't register its name there, legitimate visitors would have no way of reaching the company electronically. Id. Second, the hackers
accessed another public registry, Domain Name Service (DNS), which provides more specific information on subnets within each domain, and e-mail (electronic mail) gateways for
a company's messages. Id.
At 1:10 a.m., of the first day, now having individual targets, WheelGroup began
"bouncing" some e-mail. Id. at 59. The U.S. Postal Service, when unable to deliver a letter,
postmarks the letter so as to mark the journey of the letter--e-mail is handled in the same
way. Id. Thus, when WheelGroup sent an e-mail to an XYZ employee in New York, the
message "bounced back" because of the purposeful misspelling of the sender's name. Id.
The hackers discovered there was only one hop between the employee's computer and
XYZ's gateway. Id. If they cracked the gateway, they would gain access to XYZ's network.
Id.
At 2:02 a.m., the hackers began "pinging," which is using a software program to send
an electronic beam to every XYZ address to see which machines are alive. Id.
At 2:17 a.m., the hackers discovered a firewall, which is the software that XYZ uses to
ward off hackers. Id. For three hours they attempted to penetrate the network to no avail.
Id.
At 5:00 a.m., WheelGroup decided to forego the Internet and instead attackXYZ's individual computers by a method called "war dialing," which meant automatically dialing
thousands of phone numbers within a specific range (close to XYZ's main phone number).
Id. The hackers downloaded a free Internet hacker program called "ToneLoc" which performed the "war dialing" on one phone line and one computer for the next 16 hours. Id.
At 9:13 p.m., the hackers found that upon returning to the operating room, "ToneLoc"
had found 55 modems at XYZ. Id. In two hours, the hackers accessed a fax server at one of
XYZ's subsidiaries. Id. They cracked the passcode resulting in their ability to access a
dial-out line, which allowed them to place long-distance calls anywhere in the country. Id.
at 60. They were now able to use XYZ's computers to hack into other companies' computers
leaving XYZ to take the blame. Id. The hackers then accessed an XYZ computer near
Washington, D.C. and assumed control "to issue purchase orders, review lists of vendors
and products, and even set currency exchange rates for international sales." Id.
At 12:01 a.m., of the second day, WheelGroup accessed another computer located in
XYZ's tax department at XYZ's headquarters and gained full "root" power which meant
they could destroy all of the computer's data or leave a virus to infect the network. Id. at
60-61.
At 2:02 a.m., The hackers obtained root access to four computers in XYZ's technology
department. Id. at 61. If they were real intruders, they would install "sniffer" software, a
network traffic analyzer that captures account names and passwords as they travel the
network during business hours. Id. Then the hackers would have the information they
needed to travel from department to department. Id. Operation Nutcracker ended with a
final trick on XYZ: "E-mail spoofing." Id. The hackers sent a bogus e-mail to the XYZ
executive who approved of Fortune's experiment, proposing a $5,000 bonus to the employee
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and originated in Texas, 1,600 miles away from XYZ's headquarters in
New York. 7 Operation Nutcracker extended over a two day period, and
within that time the hackers infiltrated seven of XYZ's computers.8
They penetrated a subsidiary near Washington, D.C., and the corporate
tax division in Manhattan. 9 They achieved "root access"10 on five systems, hence enjoying the same capabilities as members of XYZ corporation. Moreover, the hackers accessed computers used exclusively by
XYZ's technology department. 1 Operation Nutcracker demonstrates
that while current security systems are very sophisticated, a hacker only
needs access to one remote computer (major corporations usually have
thousands all over the country and the world) to wreak havoc on a company's finances and operations or to have a springboard 1 2 to harm another company's computers or to steal its assets. 13 The business losses
can be staggering, as MCI discovered when hackers downloaded more
than 50,000 credit card numbers which were used to make more than

who planned the project. Id. The hackers disguised the e-mail to look like it came from one
of the executive's managers. Id. The executive responded to the surprised manager with
an, "Okay, fine." Id. WheelGroup could have intercepted the message without the manager's knowledge, but this was unnecessary as their point was already proven. Id. A final
note, Nutcracker went undetected the entire time. Id. at 57.
7. Behar, supra note 1, at 57.
8. Behar, supra note 1, at 57.
9. Behar, supra note 1, at 57.
10. Behar, supra note 1, at 57. "Root access" means having the same power over a
networked computer system as a system administrator (a person who operates and maintains the computer network). Id.
11. Behar, supra note 1, at 57.
12. Behar, supra note 1, at 58. A springboard is "anything serving as the starting
point or providing the impetus for something else." WEBSTER'S NEw WoRLD DICONARY
1298 (3rd ed. 1989). "A hacker, exploiting your somewhat lax security practices, breaks
into your network and launches attacks on other sites, using the guise of being a member of
your network as his or her access key." Aileen Crowley, In the Eyes of the Law: New Legal
Risks can Make Companies Accountable for Hackers' Rude Intrusions, PC WK-, June 17,
1996, at El. For example, Boeing reported an attack on its supercomputer center in Seattie. David Bicknell, How to Avoid Getting Snared by the Net, COMPUTER WinY., Nov. 16,
1995, at 20. Boeing was used as a "springboard" site to launch an attack on the local federal district court system. Id. Judges' rulings were altered and the local system administrator had no clue the attacks took place. Id.
13. Kate Button, Hacking Off The Hackers: Problems with Hackers in the U.S. and the
FBI's Plan to Catch Them, COMPUTER WKLY., Jan. 16, 1997, at 40. Russian hackers electronically pierced Citibank's secured computer network and stole approximately $12 million. Id. Ultimately, the FBI apprehended the hackers and all but $400,000 was recovered.
Id. "What the Citibank story brings out is that even the most sophisticated and secure
organizations [sic] (and Citibank is certainly one of them) are facing some serious risks
when it comes to electronic commerce" says security policy expert, Charles Cresson Wood of
Baseline Software in Sausalito, California. Id.
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$50 million in charges and purchases. 14
Any corporation connected to the Internet is vulnerable to hacker
intrusions because the Internet is accessed by millions of people. 15 To
make matters worse, the information on how to infiltrate a corporation is
freely available on the Internet. 16 A hacker can cause a plethora of
problems ranging from infecting a computer network with a virus 1 7 to
intentionally shutting down a corporation's computer systems so that the
corporation cannot distribute its products.' 8 In addition to severe business losses, the service, repair, and restoration costs from hacker intru14. Button, supra note 13, at 40. Tom Peltier, the corporate information protection
coordinator for Detroit Edison Power Company, suggests that "because the risk of on-line
crime is so great, there will be a mass exodus of corporate users of the Internet when they
realize their vulnerability." Id. "According to federal law enforcement estimates, online
thieves steal more than $10 billion worth of data in the United States annually." Clinton
Wilder & Bob Violino, Online Theft: Trade in Black-Market Data is a Growing Problem for
Both Business and the Law, INFORMATIONWEEK, Aug. 28, 1995, at 30. "Illegal data traded
and sold online includes calling-card numbers from long-distance telephone service providers, cellular service activation codes, stolen credit-card numbers.... and.., the bounty
also includes corporate trade secrets such as high-tech companies' research and development plans." Id. at 32.
15. Jo-Ann M. Adams, Comment, Controlling Cyberspace: Applying the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act to the Internet, 12 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 403,

406 (1996) (footnote omitted). "In all, reasonable estimates are that as many as 40 million
people around the world can and do access the enormously flexible communication Internet
medium. That figure is expected to grow to 200 million Internet users by the year 1999."
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
16. Behar, supra note 1, at 66. Virtually every weapon a hacker needs to penetrate
corporate computers is accessible on the Internet and there are even hacker magazines
available that provide step-by-step tips. Id.
17. Vicky H. Robbins, Vendor Liability for Computer Viruses and Undisclosed Disabling Devices in Software, COMPUTER LAw., July 1993, at 20. Defining a computer virus as:
[S]oftware that 'infects' a user's computer system much in the same way that a
biological virus infects a living organism. It is a program that is passed from computer to computer by secretly attaching and copying itself into other programs
that are then copied either by diskette or via computer network. A virus can be
written to perform malicious tasks after infecting a new computer or to do no more
than copy itself from machine to machine. At best, a virus is irritating and inconvenient; at worst, it can corrupt and destroy data and lock up an entire system.
Id.
18. See, e.g., Revlon Inc. v. Logisticon Inc., No. 705933 (Cal. Super. Ct., Santa Clara
Cty., complaint filed Oct. 22, 1990). The Revlon complaint did not involve a hacker but a
software company that dialed into Revlon's computer system and intentionally disabled
Revlon's system because Revlon had not paid the software company in full for software
Revlon had purchased from the software company. Id. Revlon could not distribute its
products as two of its distribution centers were shut down because its computer system was
disabled for three days losing an estimated $20 million in revenues. Id. The case was
settled out-of-court. Id. The Revlon case offers some indication that despite the generally
settled principle that tort law does not apply to purely economic loss, tortious interference
with contractual relations may be a theory upon which recovery is based. Joseph P. Zammit, Tort Liability for Mishandling Data, 322 PL/PAT 429, 440-41 (1991).
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sions can be staggering. For example, in the well-known computer virus
case of United States v. Morris,19 the damage caused by a virus ranged
from $96 million to $186 million based upon the labor costs to eradicate
20
the virus and monitor the computer systems' recovery.
Computer network security is practically nonexistent in many companies which subjects such companies to substantial risk.2 1 As the corporation Revlon, Inc. 22 discovered, a disabled computer system can

preclude a company from shipping products to its customers, thus causing millions of dollars in losses. 23 A hacker who successfully disrupts or
interferes with the operations of a business causing millions of dollars in
losses can be criminally prosecuted under the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act. 2 4 However, the Act does not provide a financial remedy to

the victim corporation or third parties harmed as a result of the victim
corporation's injury. 25 Moreover, even if the Act did provide a financial
remedy, the typical hacker does not have the financial resources to compensate the victim corporation or injured third parties. 26 Thus, there is
19. 928 F.2d 504, 505-06 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 817 (1991) (stating that

Morris created a virus that spread throughout the Internet disabling thousands of computers around the world). IBM has taken the threat of viruses very seriously by spending
millions of dollars at IBM's High Integrity Computing Laboratory ("HICL") on its computer
immune system project. ProtectionMoney, COMPUTER Bus. REV., Dec. 1, 1996, available in
1996 WL 8660446. HICL has over 200 employees and "has even recruited leading scientists from the fields of biology and immunology." Id. Experts from HICL warn "that with
8,000 known viruses already identified, and an estimated six new varieties currently being
discovered every day, the virus problem is far from being solved." Id. Analysts say companies "must treat their anti-virus polic[ies] and practices as strategic issues." Id.
20. Susan C. Lyman, Civil Remedies for the Victims of Computer Viruses, 21 Sw. U. L.
REV. 1169, 1172 (1992).

21. Crowley, supra note 12, at E8. A 1996 Computer Security Institute/FBI Computer
Crime and Security Survey asked the respondents: "Do you have a written policy on how to
deal with network intrusions?" 58% responded no and only 35% responded yes. Id. In
1988, infamous computer hacker Kevin D. Mitnick broke into Digital Equipment Corporation's purportedly secure computer network and "wreaked havoc to the tune of $4 m[illion]
in damages." Kate Button, Hunter and the Hunted, COMPUTER WKLY., Mar. 14, 1996, at 38.
"By 1992, Mitnick was officially named the FBI's most wanted computer criminal." Id.
22. Revlon, No. 705933 at 1.
23. Id. For example, Revlon alleged losses of $20 million when the defendant dialed
into Revlon's computer system and disabled it. Id.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (West Supp. 1996) (imposing criminal penalties for: 1) hackers
who intentionally access computers without authorization and whose conduct involves interstate or foreign communication or; 2) hackers who knowingly and with intent to defraud
access without authorization computers that are used in interstate or foreign
communication).
25. Id.
26. Lyman, supra note 20, at 1195. "Often, a typical computer vandal may have little
money with which to pay a judgment." Id. "[Hackers rarely have deep pockets." Behar,
supra note 1, at 60.
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a need to prevent such hardships concomitant with the need for an available remedy should such hardships occur.
This Comment proposes a tort remedy in negligence that imposes a
duty on a corporation to have adequate computer network security to
prevent hacker intrusions that can severely damage the corporation itself, or other Internet-connected third party corporations damaged resulting from the original hacker intrusion. 2 7 This issue is a unique
product of the Information Age with no established rules 28 and potentially enormous consequences. Part II of this Comment discusses the reality of the current threat of hacker intrusions, the inadequacy of current
remedies, how tort law has evolved to adequately handle computer-related cases, and why the tort of negligence is the appropriate remedy.
Part III discusses a proposed standard of care corporations should maintain to avoid tort liability in negligence, analyze how this tort remedy fits
into the current legal framework, and demonstrate a successful application of negligence principles that achieves effective corporate computer
network security and ample redress to potential victims of hacker intrusions. Part IV of this Comment concludes by proposing that liability in
tort for computer hacking is both an effective deterrent for hackers and
inadequately computer-secured corporations, and an adequate remedy
for injured parties based upon a minimum standard of care.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

THE THREAT TO CORPORATE COMPUTER NETWORKS

Is REAL

The dramatic advancements in Internet and computer security are
27. See generally Crowley, supra note 12, at El. A hacker had penetrated Net
Daemons, ironically, a network support outsourcing company that advised clients on Internet security. Id. The hacker then used Net Daemon's computer network as a springboard to connect into some of Net Daemon's customers' computer networks as Net
Daemon's computer network was already connected electronically to its customers' computer networks for business relationship reasons. Id. at E8. The hacker impersonated a
Net Daemon employee and fooled some of Net Daemon's customers' computer networks
into believing that a Net Daemon employee was entering the customers' computer networks. Id. Net Daemon's customers were upset by the security breaches, but fortunately
for Net Daemons, no one took legal action against Net Daemons. Id. Traci Bair, a program
manager at International Data Corporation in Framingham, Massachusetts, warned,
"Things like this happen all the time-holding people responsible is going to be the difference." Id. at El.
28. Behar, supra note 1, at 60. "[Tihere hasn't been such a case to date, computer
experts say it's only a matter of time." Id. "There hasn't been an important case where this
has been tested yet, but there will be," says Mark Rasch, Director of Information Security,
Law, and Policy for the security consulting firm Science Applications International Corp.,
of McLean, Va. Crowley, supra note 17, at El.
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evidenced by devices such as firewalls 2 9 and encryption 30 technology.
Nevertheless, the reality of hackers breaking into government 3 ' and corporate32 computer systems is still a critical problem. A few months ago,
Dennis Hughes, the FBI's senior expert on computer crime, stated, "[tihe
hackers are driving us nuts. Everyone is getting hacked into. It's out of
33
control."
29. Michael Rustad & Lori E. Eisenschmidt, Article, The Commercial Law of Internet
Security, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 213, 227 (1995). Firewalls are computer devices that create a
shell of protection between a network and possible intruder by restricting the flow of information entering and exiting a firm's computer or LAN (local area network) via communication devices. Id.
30. Rustad & Eisenschmidt, supra note 29, at 230. Encryption is the scrambling of a
digital message which "render[s] it meaningless to anyone who does not have the key to
decrypt the message." Id. The industry standard is RSA which is a 64-digit key which can
be broken with about $8.2 million worth of equipment. Id. at 301 n.100. "One industry
expert markets encryption systems using 170-digit RSA keys and flatly asserts they are
'unbreakable." Id. at 233.
31. Rustad & Eisenschmidt, supra note 29, at 217. The Pentagon disclosed that a 1994
internal audit of their network security performed by an in-house team utilizing hacker
techniques successfully penetrated 88% of the 8,900 government computers they hacked.
Id. Only 4% of the break-ins were detected. Id. Federal officials, using for the first time a
court-ordered wiretap on the Internet, charged an Argentine student with hacking into
computers of the Defense Department, the Navy, and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration. First Internet Wiretap Leads to a Suspect, N.Y. TmEs, Mar. 31, 1996, at
120. The student, from his computer in Buenos Aires, hacked his way into computers at the
Naval Command, the Control and Ocean Surveillance Center in San Diego, the Naval Research Laboratory in Washington, NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, CA,
NASA's Ames Research Center at Moffett Field, CA, and the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico containing "files relating to research on state-of-the-art satellites, radiation and energy-related engineering." Id. It will cost more than $100,000 just to
investigate the NASA intrusion and to secure the systems from future break-ins. Id.
32. Marc S. Friedman & Kenneth R. Buys, 'Infojacking': Crimes on the Information
Superhighway, COMPUTER LAw., Oct. 1996, at 6. An Information Week survey of 200 businesses in 1995 surprisingly concluded that 95% admitted to being victims of computer
fraud. Id. The Senate's Permanent Investigations Subcommittee reported that major
banks and corporations lost $800 million from hackers in 1995. Id. Rockwell International, Inc., a major corporation, admits to being under attack on a "regular basis" from
hackers using the Internet. Id.
33. Behar, supra note 1, at 59. In February, 1996, FBI director Louis Freeh informed a
Senate panel that "23 countries are engaging in economic spying against American businesses succeeding in some cases 'with a few keystrokes.'" Id. at 64. Freeh cited the major
culprits as China, Canada, France, India, and Japan. Id. "The biggest security problem
organizations face today is information brokers. Since the end of the Cold War there have
been a lot of people trained in espionage who don't have a lot to do." says Dan White,
national director of information security at Ernst & Young in Chicago. Wilder & Violino,
supra note at 14, at 40. Richard Ross, a supervisory agent with the FBI's national computer crime squad in Washington, D.C., says, "[clorporate secrets used to be stolen one box
at a time. Now the equivalent of a hundred boxes can be copied and E-mailed. All you need
is one hacker, and the entire hacker community may know about it by sundown." Id. at 32.
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Computer network security is virtually nonexistent in many companies and part of the reason is because of the explosive growth of personal
computers in corporate America. 34 This growth has somewhat decentralized and attenuated Management Information Systems' 35 ("MIS")
control of all the computing power within a corporation. 36 The combination of massive personal computer proliferation and growth disproportionate to MIS's ability to manage such growth, along with more
knowledgeable computer end users assuming more of the maintenance of
their own systems, leaves security gaps in a corporation's computer network. 3 7 Furthermore, companies that suffer hacker intrusions keep
quiet. 38 Most companies want to avoid the unwanted publicity. 3 9 However, keeping quiet about the problem of hacker intrusions does little to
34. Michael Henderson, PC-LAN Combinations Should Be Helpful to MIS Departments of the Fortune 1000, Comm. NEWS, Feb. 1, 1986, at 32. "The explosive growth of the
personal-computer (PC) market caught many of the Fortune 1000 data processing departments by surprise. Personal computers sprouted throughout the organizations and had
firmly established themselves before information managers could gain any semblance of
control." Id.
35. See generally Rustad & Eisenschmidt, supranote 29, at 221. Management of Information Systems is the group within a corporation that manages the mainframe computer
and all other associated computer systems. Id.
36. See generally The Business Rationale Driving Java Processors in Corporations,
DATA STORAGE REP., Mar. 1, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8622449. Before the advent of the
personal computer, the computing performed for corporate America was done by mainframe computer systems governed by the Management of Information Systems ("MIS") department. Id. MIS was responsible for the data backups and security. Rustad &
Eisenschmidt, supra note 29, at 221. As personal computer growth within corporations
exploded, LAN (local area network) administrators were hired to manage and support
these personal computers and networks. See Mary Hanna, Net Growth Outpaces Expertise,
SoFTWArE MAG., July 1, 1995, at 41. However, corporations did not have enough qualified
people to keep pace with the growth of personal computers and LANs. Id. "There just
aren't enough people to do LAN management very well," said James Hardy, enterprise
management architect at SSDS Inc., a systems integrator based in Englewood, Colorado.
Id. "Even worse, many companies aren't even aware that their people don't know how to do
it well," says Hardy. Id. Therefore, the LAN administration and security at many corporations is inadequate. Id.
37. Jim Sobczak, Who's Running the Show?, Bus. Comm. REV., Sept. 1, 1996, at 70. As
personal computers and LANs proliferated, the computing power shifted from the mainframe and MIS to the end users. Id. at 71. Therefore, the end users were more independent and could install and maintain their own software applications. Id.
38. See Richard Power, Follow the Money, LAN MAG., Oct. 1, 1996, at 54. Martha
Stansell Gamin of the U.S. Justice Department and prosecutor of infamous hacker Kevin
Mitnick, indicates that corporations are under a vast scale of hacker attacks. Bicknell,
supra note 12, at 20. Stansell Gamin claims the true numbers are kept hidden because
most companies whose systems are infiltrated are not disclosing the incidents. Id. Stansell
Gamin also asserts that for every one case that is reported, nearly 500 are kept secret. Id.
Stansell Gamin cites a Computer Security Institute report showing that incidents of proprietary business theft rose 260% from 1985 to 1993. Id. The report concludes that of 8,932
attacks, 7,860 were successful but only 19 incidents were reported. Id.
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40
promote awareness and solve the overall problem.

B.

APPLYING TORT PRINCIPLES AS A DETERRENT AND A REMEDY

Having established that the threat of hacker intrusions is real, the
next issues that must be addressed are: (1) how to provide an incentive
for corporations to take hacker intrusions more seriously; (2) how to deter hackers from infiltrating corporate computer networks; and (3) how
to provide a remedy to those injured by hacker intrusions. Unlike crimi43
nal law, 4 1 contract law, 4 2 or the law of the Uniform Commercial Code,
tort law provides an effective solution to these issues. The major pur39. Power, supra note 38, at 54. Only 17% of the respondents that suffered a hacker
intrusion reported the incident to law enforcement. Id. Over 70% of the respondents that
suffered a hacker intrusion cited negative publicity as the reason for non-disclosure. Id.
40. Bicknell, supra note 12, at 20. While keeping quiet avoids unwanted publicity, it
prevents companies from learning about each other's misfortunes and taking the appropriate future precautions. Id.
41. See generally Lyman, supra note 20, at 1197. Criminal law punishes the perpetrator and doesn't compensate the victim. Id. "The criminal law is concerned with the protec[O]ften it accomplishes its ends by
tion of interests common to the public at large ....
exacting a penalty from the wrongdoer." W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 1,
at 5 (5th ed. 1984). '[A] foremost purpose of criminal law is to serve the interest of the
state in maintaining an ordered society and deterring future crime. Victims' interests are
relegated to civil actions." Christopher T. Igielski, Note, Washington Defendants' New
Right of Pre-TrialFlight, 19 SEATrLE U. L. REv. 633, 633-34 (1996)(footnote omitted).
42. See generally John Jay Fossett, The Development of Negligence in Computer Law,
14 N. Ky. L. REv. 289, 291 (1987). Contract law presupposes a prior agreement and this is
not feasible for unknown but foreseeable plaintiffs (a company or person injured because of
another company's lax computer security). Id. For example, hacker A infiltrates and uses
company B's powerful computer network to penetrate and disable company C's computer
network causing company C to fail to deliver mission critical components to a customer.
See id. "[T]o deny recovery in this instance for lack of privity of contract is fundamentally
unfair." Cheryl S. Massingale & A. Faye Borthick, Risk Allocation for Computer System
Security Breaches: PotentialLiability for Providersof Computer Services, 12 W. NEW ENG.
L. REv. 167, 185 (1990). "Contract liability is imposed by the law for the protection of a
single, limited interest, that of having the promises of others performed." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 41, § 1, at 5. Thus, if hacker A uses company B's computer network to
penetrate and disable company C's computer network, company C cannot recover from
company B using a contract theory of recovery because there were no promises or prior
agreements made. See generally id.
43. BLAcK's LAw DIcrIoNARY 1064 (6th ed. 1991). Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.)
is a code of law "governing commercial transactions (including the sales and leasing of
goods, transfer of funds, commercial paper, bank deposits and collection, letters of credit,
bulk transfers, warehouse receipts, bills of lading, investment securities, and secured
transactions)." Id. Thus, U.C.C. law is similar to contract law and suffers from the same
inability to redress injuries to parties not part of the original bargain or transaction. See
generally Fossett, supra note 42, at 291.

176

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XVI

poses of tort law, 44 besides preventing people from "taking the law into
their own hands," are: (1) to deter wrongful conduct; (2) to encourage
socially responsible behavior; and (3) to restore injured parties to their
original condition by compensating them for their injuries. 45 Applying
tort law to corporations deters companies from having lax computer network security; applying tort law to hackers deters them from infiltrating
companies because of the threat of monetary penalties. 4 6 Tort law encourages socially responsible behavior from companies by imposing a
duty on them to exercise reasonable care in providing corporate computer network security.4 7 Tort law also encourages socially responsible
behavior from hackers because of their duty not to penetrate corporate
48
If
computer networks where a foreseeable injury to another can occur.
companies or hackers breach their duty then the injured parties are compensated for their injuries and are restored "to their original condition,

insofar as the law can do this
C.

How

. .

.49

NEGLIGENCE HAS EVOLVED TO ADEQUATELY HANDLE
COMPUTER CASES

Traditionally, contract law, not tort law, has been the basis of recovery for most computer-related cases. 50 This is because the damages from
a computer-related claim were almost exclusively economic, and courts
51
have traditionally denied negligence claims for purely economic losses.
The prohibition of negligence claims for purely economic losses was
sometimes called either the "per se prohibitory rule," the "physical harm
rule," or the "economic loss rule." 52 The rule barred recovery for economic losses absent physical injury or property damage.5 3 The economic
loss rule's rationale was to prevent "mass litigation, fraudulent claims,
44. JOHN W. WADE, ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND ScHwART'zs TORTS 1 (9th ed. 1994).

"A tort is a civil wrong... for which the law provides a remedy. This area of law imposes
duties on persons to act in a manner that will not injure other persons." Id.
45. Id.
46. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 41, § 1, at 6. "The purpose of the law of torts is to
adjust [for]... losses, and to afford compensation for injuries sustained by one person as
the result of the conduct of another." Id. (quoting Cecil A. Wright, Introductionto the Law
of Torts, 8 CAMBRiDGE L.J. 238 (1944)).
47. See generally WADE ET AL., supra note 44, at 1.
48. See generally WADE ET AL., supra note 44, at 1.
49. WADE ET AL., supra note 44, at 1.

50. Fossett, supra note 42, at 291.
51. Massingale & Borthick, supra note 42, at 181.
52. See Massingale & Borthick, supra note 42, at 181-182. "[Tlhe economic loss rule
precludes tort recovery of economic loss in the absence of physical injury to persons or other
property." Timothy Davis, College Athletics: Testing the Boundaries of Contract and Tort,
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 971, 992-93 (1996) (footnote omitted).
53. See Massingale & Borthick, supra note 42, at 181. See also Davis, supra note 52, at
992-93.
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and liability disproportionate to the defendant's fault."5 4 However, there
are fundamental problems with this rule when applied to computer-related cases. For example, hacker A illegally 55 penetrates corporation B's
inadequately secured computer network. Then hacker A, impersonating
a legitimate corporation B computer network user, uses the significant
computing power of corporation B's computer network as a springboard
to penetrate and shut down corporation C's computer network. Corporation C's business suffers severe financial loss. In this scenario, Corporation B escapes liability because the economic loss rule bars recovery for
56
economic damages absent physical injury.
Today, many courts recognize the fundamental unfairness of the economic loss rule and, therefore, are allowing recovery in negligence for
purely economic losses. 5 7 In People Express Airlines v. ConsolidatedRail

Corporation,58 the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded, "a defendant
who has breached his duty of care to avoid the risk of economic injury to
particularly foreseeable plaintiffs may be held liable for actual economic
losses that are proximately caused by its breach of duty."59 Some com-

mentators argue that contract theories, rather than negligence theories,
should apply in all computer cases resulting in economic loss.

60

How-

ever, using the above example of hacker A penetrating corporation B and
using corporation B's computer network to penetrate and harm corporation C, contract law fails to provide a remedy to corporation C for hacker
54. Massingale & Borthick, supra note 42, at 182.

55. See Adams, supra note 15, at 409 (describing computer hacking as a computer
crime). "The hacker may go beyond breaking into a computer system and actually alter or
destroy data." Id. at 410.
56. Davis, supra note 52, at 992-93.
57. See People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107 (N.J. 1985)
(rejecting the economic loss rule and allowing the plaintiff corporation to prosecute its
claim for purely economic loss when a railway accident caused a tank of flammable liquid to
spill and ignite near the plaintiff's business. The fire was contained and no physical damage occurred though the plaintiffs business operations were interrupted sustaining large
financial losses). See also J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60, 64 (Cal. 1979) (stating
"[w]here the risk of harm is foreseeable, as it was in the present case, an injury to the
plaintiff's economic interests should not go uncompensated merely because it was unaccompanied by any injury to his person or property"); Mattingly v. Sheldon Jackson College, 743
P.2d 356, 360 (Ala. 1987) (holding "[a] defendant owes a duty of care to take reasonable
measures to avoid the risk of causing economic damages, aside from physical injury [or
property damage] ... ."). But see Dundee Cement Co. v. Chemical Labs., Inc., 712 F.2d
1166 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding a cement plant could not recover from a truck owner and
driver responsible for blocking the only road to the cement plant, allegedly causing purely
economic damages because of the cement plant customers' inability to reach the plant).
58. 495 A.2d at 107.
59. Id. at 118.
60. Massingale & Borthick, supra note 42, at 185.
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A's misdeeds 6 ' because corporation C is not in privity6 2 (a general requirement of contract law for liability) with corporation B. Therefore,
the theory of negligence is more appropriate as it provides a remedy to
injured third parties (e.g., corporation C) and avoids the overly harsh
result of contract law.6 3 Injured third parties are now more likely than
ever to need a negligence remedy in an Information Age where anonymous access to the Internet fosters an environment in which unidentifi64
able perpetrators can injure third parties.
D. THE PROPOSED REMEDY IN NEGLIGENCE-AN OVERvIEw
Currently, there is no direct case law providing a remedy to a third
party corporation injured on the Internet by a hacker's illegal use of another corporation's computer network to inflict harm.6 5 Yet, one day
there might be a case where a hacker easily penetrates a corporation's
computer network as many corporations have not taken adequate security measures. According to security expert Clifford Stoll, "[t]he security
weaknesses of both systems and networks, particularly the needless vulnerability due to sloppy systems management and administration, result
in a surprising success rate for unsophisticated attacks."6 6 The question
then becomes how to motivate corporations to take computer network
67
security more seriously? The answer lies with the theory of negligence
8
6
meaning "those who use computers have a duty to use them with care."
61. See Adams, supra note 15, at 410-11 (discussing how a hacker can break into a
computer system and alter or destroy data).
62. BLAcKs LAW DICTIONARY 833 (6th ed. 1991). Privity of contract is that connection
or relationship which exists between two or more contracting parties. Id.
63. See Fossett, supra note 42, at 292 (discussing the advantages of negligence theories
over contract theories).
64. See, e.g., Wilder & Violino, supra note 14, at 32 (discussing the use of anonymous
remailer programs that strip the e-mail identifiers from an e-mail message making the email anonymous and untraceable).
65. Crowley, supra note 12, at El. "There hasn't been an important case where this
has been tested yet, but there will be," says Mark Rasch, Director of Information Security,
Law, and Policy for the security consulting firm Science Applications International Corp.,
of McLean, Va. Id. "[There hasn't been such a case to date, computer experts say it's only
a matter of time." Behar, supra note 1, at 60.
66. Massingale & Borthick, supra note 42, at 172.

67.

WADE ET AL.,

supra note 44, at 131. Negligence is "conduct which falls below the

standard of care established by law for the protection of others against the unreasonable
risk of harm." Id.
68. Fossett, supra note 42, at 293-94. "Holding a company responsible for the actions
of its computer does not exhibit a distaste for modem business practices .... The fact that
[business operations] are carried out by an unimaginative mechanical device can have no
effect on the company's responsibility for ...errors and oversights." State Farm Mutual
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bockhorst, 453 F.2d 533, 536-37 (10th Cir. 1972).
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Negligence provides a fair and equitable allocation of incentives, deterrence, and remedies to all parties involved as it fulfills three major
objectives: (1) provides an incentive for corporations to take their computer network security more seriously; (2) deters hackers from illegally
dialing into computer networks because even unintentional harm may
make them liable; and (3) provides injured corporations or persons a
remedy for their injuries. 6 9 A plaintiff may recover in negligence if he or
she can prove the following elements: (1) a duty to use reasonable care;
(2) a breach of that duty; (3) a reasonably close causal connection between the conduct and resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage to
70
the protected interest of another.
1. Duty of Reasonable Care
The plaintiff must prove that the corporation has a legal duty to the
plaintiff to exercise reasonable care in maintaining adequate computer
network security, thereby, protecting the plaintiff from an unreasonable
risk of harm that could result from hacker intrusions. 7 ' Reasonable care
is usually defined as the degree of care a reasonable person would exercise under the circumstances. 72 The risk reasonably perceived defines
69. See WADE

ET AL.,

supra note 44, at 1.

70. See WADE ET AL., supra note 44, at 131.
71. See WADE ET AL., supra note 44, at 131. "A duty, or obligation, recognized by the

law, requiring the person to conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of
others against unreasonable risks." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 41, § 30, at 164. "[The
[corporation] is required to conduct [itself] in a particular manner at the risk that if [it]
does not do so [it] becomes subject to liability to another to whom the duty is owed for any
injury sustained by such other, of which that actor's conduct is a legal cause." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4 (1965). "The duty of any person is the obligation of due care to
refrain from any act which will cause foreseeable harm to others even though the nature of
that harm and the identity of the harmed person or harmed interest is unknown at the
time of the act.... " Donohue v. Senecal, 541 N.W.2d 742, 747 (Wis. 1995) (quoting A.E.
Inv. Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 214 N.W.2d 764, 766 (Wis. 1974)).
72. Massingale & Borthick, supra note 42, at 176-77. "The standard of conduct imposed by the law is an external one, based upon what society demands generally of its
members, rather than upon the actor's personal morality or individual sense of right or
wrong." PROSSER & KEEON, supra note 41, § 30, at 169. At common law, the standard of
conduct was that of a "reasonable man under like circumstances." The "reasonable man" is
denoted as:
[A] person exercising those qualities of attention, knowledge, intelligence, and
judgment which society requires of its members for the protection of their own
interests and the interests of others. It enables those who are to determine
whether the actor's conduct is such as to subject him to liability for harm caused
thereby, to express their judgment in terms of the conduct of a human being. The
fact that this judgment is personified in a 'man' calls attention to the necessity of
taking into account the fallibility of human beings.
RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF ToiRrs § 283 cmt. b (1965).
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the duty owed and limits that duty to foreseeable plaintiffs. 73 Therefore,
the plaintiff must show that the risk was foreseeable and that he or she
could have been harmed by a hacker's intrusion.7 4 Whether the corpora75
tion has a duty to a particular plaintiff is a question of law.
2. Breach of Duty
The plaintiff must also prove that the corporation breached its duty
to exercise reasonable care. 76 There are several ways for a corporation to
breach its duty. Such ways include "failure to recognize defects in [its
computer network security], the failure to correct defects, or the failure
to warn of the defects."7 7 The plaintiff may also prove a breach of duty
by showing a failure to train and supervise employees on adequate security procedures7 8 or failure to utilize reasonable means 79 to secure the
computer network from unauthorized use.80
73. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928). "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to
another or to others within the range of apprehension." Id. "It is said that the defendant's
responsibility must be limited to harm which results from the realization of the particular
risk or hazard which the defendant has created." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 41, § 43,
at 283.
74. Sun 'n Sand, Inc. v. United Cal. Bank, 582 P.2d 920, 936 (Cal. 1978) (quoting Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968)). "[Tlhe chief element in determining whether
defendant owes a duty... to plaintiff is the foreseeability of the risk." Id. "A defendant's
duty is established when it can be said that it was foreseeable that his act or omission to
act may cause harm to someone. A party is negligent when he commits an act when some
harm to someone is foreseeable." Donahue, 541 N.W.2d at 747 (quoting Rolph v. EBI Cos.,
464 N.W.2d 667 (Wis. 1991)). "A duty may exist to one who is unknown and remote in time
and place." Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 483 N.E.2d 906, 951 (Ill. App. Ct.
1985).
75. Midkiff v. Hines, 866 S.W.2d 328, 332 (Tex. App. 1993) (stating "[glenerally, the
existence of a duty is a question of law"). See also Ernst v. Parkshore Club Apts. Ltd.
Partnership, 863 F. Supp. 651, 654 (N.D. 111. 1994). "Whether defendants owed a duty of
care is a question of law to be decided by the court." Id.
76. WADE ET AL., supra note 42, at 131. "A failure to conform to the standard [of conduct imposed by law] is negligence, ... even if it is due to clumsiness, stupidity, forgetfulness, an excitable temperament, or even sheer ignorance .... In other words, society may
require of a person [or corporation] not to be awkward or a fool." PROSSER & KEETON, supra
note 41, § 31, at 169.
77. Massingale & Borthick, supra note 42, at 178.
78. See generallyErnst, 863 F. Supp. at 655. "[E]mployers are directly liable for negligent hiring and retention, and, thus, have a duty to refrain from hiring or retaining an
employee who is a threat to third persons. ... " Id.
79. See Marie A. Wright, Protecting Information from Internet Threats, COmPUTER
FRMUi& SEcURrrY BuLL., Mar. 1, 1995, availablein 1995 WL 8321941. Reasonable means
to secure a computer network include using a firewall, using encryption technology, requiring employees to implement standard security procedures such as virus checks, periodic
password changes and/or using more complex passwords. Id.
80. Massingale & Borthick, supra note 42, at 178.
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Proximate Cause

The third element the plaintiff must prove is that the corporation's
failure to provide adequate security was the proximate cause s ' of the
plaintiff s injury.8 2 Proving proximate cause means: (1) showing the defendant's act or omission was the actual cause or cause-in-fact of the injury;8 3 and (2) that the plaintiffs injury was the foreseeable consequence
of the risk created by the defendant's act or omission.8 4 Therefore, if the
plaintiff can demonstrate that the corporation's failure to provide adequate computer network security was the actual cause of the injury and
that the plaintiffs injury was the foreseeable consequence of the corporation's failure to provide adequate computer network security, then the
plaintiff has a prima facie case of proximate cause.
There can be more than one proximate cause but the plaintiff only
has to prove one proximate cause to recover.8 5 For example, hacker A's
illegal entry into corporation B's computer network can be one cause,
corporation B's inadequate computer security can be another cause, and
if hacker A uses the corporation B's computer network as a springboard
into corporation C's computer network, corporation C's inadequate computer network security can also be another cause. However, if corporation C (the plaintiff) sues corporation B (the defendant) for failure to
provide adequate computer network security, defendant corporation B
81. BARRoN's LAw DIcTIoNARY 64 (3rd ed. 1991). Proximate cause is "that which in a
natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any new independent cause produces an
event, and without which the injury would not have occurred." Id. "'Proximate
cause'. . . is merely the limitation which the courts have placed upon the actor's responsibility for the consequences of the actor's conduct .... [It] must be limited to those causes
which are so closely connected with the result and of such significance that the law is justified in imposing liability." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 41, § 41, at 264.
82. WADE ET AL., supra note 44, at 131. "A reasonably close causal connection between
the conduct and the resulting injury." Id.
83. BLAcK'S LAw DicroNARY 152 (6th ed. 1991). "That particular cause which produces an event and without which the event would not have occurred." Id. "The defendant's conduct is a cause of the event if the event would not have occurred but for that
conduct; conversely, the defendant's conduct is not a cause of the event, if the event would
have occurred without it." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 41, § 41, at 266.
84. Massingale & Borthick, supra note 42, at 178. "Foreseeability relates to the natural and probable consequences of an act. One need only reasonably foresee that an injury
may result from a dangerous condition .... The particular kind of injury need not have
been foreseen." Hueston v. Narragansett Tennis Club, Inc., 502 A.2d 827, 830 (R.I. 1986).
"A duty of care runs only to 'foreseeable plaintiffs,' any person or class of persons who could
reasonably be expected to be injured by the system manager's negligence." Massingale &
Borthick, supra note 42, at 178.
85. See Hueston, 502 A.2d at 830 (holding that a concurring cause can be a proximate
cause of a plaintiffs injury). See also Nobles v. White County, Illinois, 973 F.2d 544, 549
(7th Cir. 1992) (stating that there can be more than one proximate cause of a plaintiffs
injury).
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will argue that hacker A's criminal act was unforeseeable 86 and therefore, constituted an intervening cause.8 7 Plaintiff corporation C can defeat this argument by showing that hacker A's illegal access was
foreseeable and that defendant corporation B's failure to provide adequate computer network security was the proximate cause of plaintiff
88
corporation C's injury.
4. Damages or Injury
The final element the plaintiff must prove in a negligence case is
that he or she suffered an injury.8 9 The damages suffered by a plaintiff
from a hacker's illegal acts or a corporation's inadequate security will
almost exclusively comprise of economic damages. 90 As discussed earlier, 9 1 courts in the past have not allowed negligence claims for purely
economic losses. However, some modern courts are allowing such claims
92
and may continue to do so as more technology-related claims arise.
III. ANALYSIS
A.

THE CURRENT PROBLEM OF No MINUMUM CORPORATE COMPUTER
NETWORK SECURITY STANDARDS

Most corporations have always taken steps to protect their documents from unauthorized access by securing the documents in locked file
86. See Barnes v. Gulf Power Co., 517 So.2d 717, 718 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (holding
that a criminal attack upon the plaintiffs by unknown assailants was an unforeseeable
independent intervening cause of the plaintiffs injuries, thus releasing the defendant employer of the plaintiffs from liability).
87. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 568 (6th ed. 1991). Intervening cause is [a]n act of an
independent agency which destroys the causal connection between the negligent act of the
defendant and the [plaintiffs] wrongful injury," thus relieving the defendant of liability.
Id.
88. See Britton v. Wooten, 817 S.W.2d 443, 449 (Ky. 1991) (rejecting the general rule
that the criminal acts of third parties relieve the original negligent party from liability).
See also Arneil v. Schnitzer, 144 P.2d 707, 718 (Or. 1944) (applying the principle that if a
criminal act is reasonably foreseeable, the causal connection between the defendant's original negligent act is not broken by the intervening criminal act); Hodge v. Nor-Cen, Inc., 527
N.E.2d 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the criminal act of an arsonist was not an
intervening event that broke the causal connection between the landlord's negligence and
the plaintiffs injuries).
89. Massingale & Borthick, supra note 42, at 181. Injury is the "[aictual loss or damage resulting to the interests of another." WADE ET AL., supra note 44, at 131.
90. Massingale & Borthick, supra note 42, at 181 (discussing that most injuries suffered in computer cases are economic).
91. See discussion supra Part II.C.
92. See, e.g., People Express Airlines v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107 (N.J. 1985).
See also, e.g., Thompson v. San Antonio Retail Merchants Ass'n, 682 F.2d 509, 515 (5th Cir.
1982) (affirming trial court's findings that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care
in programming its computer system causing the plaintiffs credit report to be inaccurate).
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cabinets behind locked doors. 93 Just as corporate clients expect a busi-

ness to secure their physical files from unauthorized access, they should
also expect a business to secure its computerized fies from unauthorized
access. 94 Unfortunately, there are no generally accepted computer network security standards that corporations must folow.

95

Thus, a plain-

tiff who incurs damages because of a corporation's inadequate computer
network security will not have a remedy, unless the plaintiff shows the
corporation owed the plaintiff a duty to exercise reasonable care in protecting the corporation's computer network. 96 Therefore, to provide an
incentive for corporations to maintain adequate computer network security and to provide injured plaintiffs a remedy, a minimum standard of
computer network security must be delineated and maintained.
B.

DEFINING THE

DuTY

OF MINIMUM COMPUTER NETWORK SECURITY
LEVELS FOR CORPORATIONS

In general, a corporation's duty can be defined as a duty to select and
implement security measures, to monitor the security measures' effectiveness, and to maintain and adapt the security measures according to
changing security needs. 9 7 When implementing security measures, a
corporation must balance the cost of adequate security versus the usability of a system as a company does not want to implement security measures so cumbersome that they reduce employee productivity.9" Yet,
when in doubt, a corporation should err on the side of caution and maintain the following minimum computer network security standards. 99
93. Michael H. Agranoff, Curb on Technology: Liability for Failureto Protect Computerized Data Against UnauthorizedAccess, 5 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
263, 267 (1989).

94. Id.
95. Id. at 274. "[Tihere are no generally-accepted industry-wide standards of due care
for the protection of computerized data, and even more surprising is the fact that computer
security principles have been well known to practitioners for over a decade." Id.
96. Agranoff, supra note 93, at 274. "Thus, presently, enterprises which hold computerized data are virtually free from liability for harm caused by unauthorized access, even
though the methods to protect that data are common knowledge in the industry." Id.
97. Massingale & Borthick, supra note 42, at 187.
98. J. MARTIN, SECURIry, ACCURACY, AND PRIVACY IN COMPUTER SYSTEMs 5 (1973).
"Security and accuracy controls increase the cost of a computer system and in some cases
degrade its performance somewhat." Id.
99. Massingale & Borthick, supra note 42, at 187. This comment recognizes the financial impracticality for small companies to implement a comprehensive computer security
regime. Thus, the size and financial resources of a company must be considered when determining the scope of a company's duty pursuant to the minimum computer network security standards proposed in this comment.
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1. Establish and Publicize a CorporateComputer Network Security
Policy
Security measures and policies can be difficult to implement and are
often inconsistent. 10 0 However, a corporation's security policy is essential to establishing both the systems and data being protected, and the
necessary security procedures protecting such systems and data.' 0 ' The
policy should describe the corporation's overall security objectives, reflect
the corporation's serious concern of the risk of hacker intrusions, include
provisions for performing a risk analysis, assign employee responsibility
and accountability, and plan for disaster recovery (i.e., have a backup
plan if systems or data are compromised).10 2 A corporation must commit
itself to this security policy to show the corporation exercised reasonable
care in providing an adequate computer network security policy.
2. Prevent UnauthorizedAccess to Computer Systems
According to Michael H. Agranoff, a computer security expert,
"[aiccess control software is the heart of any computer security system.
Its viability clearly depends upon proving the identity of the person attempting to access the system. This is usually done via a password."' 03
Thus, passwords are probably the most important and yet most vulnerable 10 4 element of computer security because users have typically been
careless with their passwords. 10 5 Users have typically chosen obvious
combinations like their initials or spouse's name, or they write them
down and put the passwords in their desks.10 6 "It is estimated that 'over
half of the passwords in use are said to be the first names of spouses and
children, birthday and anniversary dates, or the names of super-he100. Wright, supra note 79.
101. Wright, supra note 79. "[A]n Internet security plan must be considered in the context of overall [corporation] and computer security." Dave James, Barbariansat the Gate:
Internet Security in the Law Firm/CorporateEnvironment, 425 PLI/PAT 277, 308 (1995).
Internet and phone-connected corporations "don't exist in isolation, and Internet security
must be considered in the context of a [corporation's] overall security plan." Id. at 293.
102. Wright, supra note 79.
103. Agranoff, supra note 93, at 285.
104. Rustad & Eisenschmidt, supra note 29, at 228. "The current overwhelming ignorance and indifference toward password security in companies constitutes one of the greatest threats to computer systems' security." Id. at 239.
105. Massingale & Borthick, supra note 42, at 190. "[T]he tendency of persons to choose
easily-remembered (and thus easily-guessed) passwords, or even to write these passwords
down in an obvious place, is part of security folklore." Agranoff, supra note 93, at 290.
106. Massingale & Borthick, supra note 42, at 190. "When allowed to choose their own
passwords, many people tend to pick passwords that are easy for them to remember or
use .... These kinds of passwords are not too difficult to guess." Emilio Jaksetic, Passwords One Step Toward Ensuring Computer Security, CoRP. LEGAL TImEs, Apr., 1996, at
19.
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roes.'" 10 7 A corporation should encourage users to use passwords that
are not easy to guess like pronounceable nonsense words, or words with
numbers or special characters inserted, and yet are easy to remember.' 0 8
A corporation should also encourage users to memorize their passwords
and not write them down, and also should encourage employees to
change their passwords every few months.' 0 9
Hacker programs are available that crack passwords by trying every
word in the dictionary (including variants of words and names) until it
guesses the correct password."i 0 Thus, with the high speed of computers
and the comprehensiveness of these dictionary programs, common passwords can be cracked within minutes or hours."' However, even rudimentary security programs can detect these attempts and set off an
alarm that can log the hacker off the system."12 Therefore, if a corporation takes adequate measures to encourage its employees to use more
complicated passwords, then the corporation can show it exercised reasonable care in implementing password security.
3. Implement Administrative Security Controls
Administrative security controls ensure that the policies and procedures for maintaining computer security are properly utilized."i 3 Administrative controls include establishing a separate security apparatus
i5
in a corporation," i4 educating employees about computer security,"
107. Rustad & Eisenschmidt, supra note 29, at 229.
108. Jaksetic, supra note 106, at 19. "[Use pass phrases that consist of combinations of
two or three 4-letter or 5-letter words randomly selected from a dictionary, with arbitrary
numbers or symbols (e.g., crest!pear or dust5rent)." Id.
109. Jaksetic, supra note 106, at 19. "However a password is generated, its security
value decreases with time. As a rule of thumb, you should change your password every six
months or sooner." Id.
110. Rustad & Eisenschmidt, supra note 29, at 229. '[Hiackers can use software programs that systematically try to crack passwords. Such programs will have a high degree
of success against poorly chosen passwords." Jaksetic, supra note 106, at 19. "There are
many programs and databases available that help hackers guess passwords, and if you use
a password based on any known word, it will likely be included in one or more of these
databases." James, supra note 101, at 305-06 (footnote omitted).
111. Rustad & Eisenschmidt, supra note 29, at 229.
112. Rustad & Eisenschmidt, supra note 29, at 229.
113. Agranoff, supra note 93, at 288.
114. Agranoff, supra note 93, at 288. "Establishing and implementing security policies
for all employees and creating an IT [Information Technology] security officer position to
monitor compliance will go far in a court battle to establish due diligence." Crowley, supra
note 12 at E8.
115. See Agranoff, supra note 93, at 288. For example, conducting training classes to
teach employees to keep their passwords confidential and to keep their computers and offices physically secure. See generally Massingale & Borthick, supra note 42, at 188-89.
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posting the corporation's security policies,' 1 6 performing background
checks on employees who have access to sensitive information, 11 7 protecting against computer viruses, 1 18 ensuring the corporation has insurance' 19 against data disaster or virus attacks, and ensuring the physical
120
locations of computers and other sensitive components are secured.
The administrative controls are the procedural mechanisms for the company's computer security policy.121 Thus, if the corporation can properly
implement its administrative security controls, then the corporation can
show it exercised reasonable care in its procedures and policies for providing adequate computer network security.
4. Install Firewalls
Firewalls are extremely important in preventing hackers on the In122
ternet from penetrating a corporation's internal computer network.
Firewalls are hardware and software devices (sometimes referred to as
routers or gateways) that link a computer network to the Internet and
prevent unauthorized access. 123 Firewalls can isolate effectively a corporate computer network from the outside world by monitoring and restricting all incoming and outgoing communications and by regulating
116. Setting up a CorporatePolicy for Internet Use: A Checklist, COMPTER LAW STRATEGIST, Oct. 1995, at 5. For example, providing notice (written or on the computer screen)
that unauthorized use is not permitted. Id.
117. See generally Agranoff, supra note 93, at 288. For example, not hiring a felon convicted of robbery to protect a corporation's trade secrets. Id.
118. See Agranoff, supra note 93, at 288. For example, installing anti-virus software
and ensuring that all disks entering and leaving a company are virus free. Thirty Steps to
Information Security, COMPUTER FRAUD & SEcuRrry BULL., Aug. 1, 1996, available in 1996
WL 8723589. Also, "[dlownload [data] only from trusted sites, or don't download [data] at
all." James, supra note 101, at 297.
119. Robbins, supra note 17, at 20. "Recently, insurance companies have begun to offer
all-risk computer insurance policies which specifically include coverage for losses caused by
computer viruses." Id.
120. Agranoff, supra note 93, at 284-85. "Physical security controls have two main
objectives: to restrict access to facilities, and to protect hardware and software from damage if disaster occurs." Id. Advice to a computer system manager is:
You also need to keep your backup tapes or disks physically secure (from both
human and non-human threats) and keep copies in a location separate from the
machine you've backed up (in cases of fire, flood, etc., if the backup is near the
original data source both may be destroyed).
James, supra note 101, at 299.
121. Agranoff, supra note 93, at 288.
122. Rustad & Eisenschmidt, supra note 29, at 227. "Firewalls create a shell of protection between a network and possible intruders." Id. "[A] firewall is now almost
mandatory." James, supra note 101, at 292.
123. Rustad & Eisenschmidt, supra note 29, at 227. Firewalls can also link an individual computer to the Internet but typically act as a gatekeeper to all of the communication
traffic coming into and out of the corporate network. Id.
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remote dial-in access. 12 4 Firewalls are not impenetrable but are a very
effective deterrent 12 5 and are important to show the corporation exercised reasonable care in protecting its computer network.
5.

Use Encryption Technology

Despite the corporate use of security policies, passwords, and
firewalls, the communication channels to and from a corporation are still
unsafe as hackers can intercept incoming and outgoing communications. 126 Therefore, a method to protect the transmitted data must be
utilized and encryption 127 technology is the answer. "Encryption refers
to any algorithm 128 applied to a digital message which scrambles the
plain text message, rendering it meaningless to anyone who does not
have the key to decrypt the message." 129 Encryption protects the integrity and confidentiality of a corporation's data and ensures its authenticity, whether it is stored or transmitted across communication
channels.

130

There are many types of encryption technologies but generally, these
technologies are categorized as private key systems and public key systems.' 3 ' Private key systems use the same key to encrypt and decrypt
messages, therefore, it is important that only the sender and receiver
know the key.13 2 The most popular and widely used private key system
is the Data Encryption Standard ("DES"), which is the federal encryption
124. Rustad & Eisenschmidt, supra note 29, at 227-28. "Firewall technology has
evolved considerably in recent years and now provides significant protection against the
unwanted inflow or outflow of digital data." Id. at 288.
125. Behar, supra note 1, at 59 (discussing that the hackers were unable to crack XYZ
corporation's firewall).
126. Agranoff, supra note 93, at 287. "For some transmission of data, it just doesn't
make sense to use the Internet or any other insecure channel. While it's certainly possible
to hack into phone lines or leased lines, it's more difficult and occurs less frequently than on
the Internet." James, supra note 101, at 307.
127. ChangingPolicies Towards Encryption and Internet Security, COMPUTER FRAUD &
SECURITY BULL., June 1, 1996, available in WL 8723573. Encryption comes from ancient
Greek and means "secret writing." Id. "Encryption... is the only known defense to wiretapping." Agranoff, supra note 93, at 287. "If you need to send confidential information
through the Internet or other insecure channels, or if you can't guarantee the physical
security of your in-house computers, then the best way to protect your data from unauthorized access is to encrypt it." James, supra note 101, at 299.
128. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 33, 34 (3rd ed. 1989). "[Amny systematic
method of solving a certain kind of problem" or "a predetermined set of instructions for
solving a specific problem in a limited number of steps." Id.
129. Rustad & Eisenschmidt, supra note 29, at 230.
130. Rustad & Eisenschmidt, supra note 29, at 231-32. "Encryption may be used to
protect passwords and data, and to verify communications." Id. at 301 n.78.
131. Wright, supra note 79.
132. Wright, supra note 79. "With private-key cryptography, the same secret key is
used both to encrypt and decrypt a file." James, supra note 101, at 300.
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standard enunciated in 1977.133 However, there is a growing concern
13 4
however that the DES standard is too weak for today's requirements.
Public key systems use two different keys, one private and one public, to encrypt and decrypt messages. 135 "[T]he sender and receiver need
not share a secret key." 136 Instead, the receiver generates a public key
and a private key. 13 7 The sender encrypts a message using the public
key; however, the message cannot be read without the corresponding private key.13 8 The most powerful and widely used public key system is the
RSA algorithm. 13 9 While RSA is extremely powerful and safe, RSA is
significantly slower than DES. 140 In order to get the best of both worlds,
a corporation can use a combination of DES and RSA algorithms to provide confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity in the corporation's computer network environment.' 41 Encryption technology is not
133. Wright, supra note 79. "The federal government has used Data Encryption Standard ("DES"), a 56-bit, single key encryption technology, since the mid-1970s for its sensitive, but not classified, information." Rustad & Eisenschmidt, supra note 29, at 230
(footnote omitted).
134. Rustad & Eisenschmidt, supra note 29, at 231. "[The National Institute of Standards & Technology ("NIST"), while reauthorizing the government's use of DES in 1993,
simultaneously indicated the approaching end of its usefulness." Id.
135. Wright, supra note 79.
136. James, supra note 101, at 302.
137. James, supra note 101, at 302. The receiver can send the public key over the Internet, thus the name "public key." Id.
138. James, supra note 101, at 302. "Messages encrypted with the receiver's public key
can be decrypted only with the corresponding private key." Id. It is not mathematically
feasible to determine the private key code from the public key and vice versa. Wright,
supra note 79.
139. Rustad & Eisenschmidt, supra note 29, at 231. "RSA is marketed by RSA Data
Security of Redwood City, California, and it has become the de facto encryption industry
standard." Id. "RSA" represents the names of its inventors: Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and
Leonard Adleman. Id. at 301 n.87.
140. Rustad & Eisenschmidt, supra note 29, at 231-32. "One drawback of using publickey systems is that encryption and decryption are typically much slower than are privatekey systems (depending on the implementation, DES can be from 100 to 10,000 times as
fast as RSA)." James, supra note 101, at 304.
141. Rustad & Eisenschmidt, supra note 29, at 231-232. These authors discuss that:
While public key processing has the disadvantage of being about 100-times slower
in software and 1,000 times slower in hardware than DES, various methods are
already circulating to mitigate this shortcoming. One solution is to use RSA primarily to transmit brief messages. For longer messages, RSA encryption can be
used to send the recipient a one-time single key encryption scheme, which then
can be used to send the subsequent long message. Since the single key encryption
scheme is used only one time, the security of the transmission is not compromised.
A third method, known as 'RSA digital envelope,' combines DES and RSA as follows: '[F]irst the message is encrypted with a random DES key, and then, before
being sent over an insecure communications channel, the DES key is encrypted
with RSA. Together, the DES-encrypted message and the RSA-encrypted message
are sent.'
Id. at 232 (footnotes omitted).
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impenetrable 142 but whatever type of encryption a corporation uses, encryption technology is important to secure the data communication lines
to and from a corporation's computer network. A corporation's use of encryption technology is essential to show the corporation exercised due
care in securing its communication lines to and from its computer
network.
6. Protect Computer Resources from InsiderAbuse
A- corporation must secure its computer network not only from outsider intrusions, but also from insider intrusions by its own employees. 143 Corporate losses from insider intrusions can be staggering. A
November 23, 1996 Information Systems Security survey of 236 security
managers and executives concluded that 46 percent of the 236 companies
admitted insider abuse of their computer systems.' 4 4 The losses were
dramatic: 22 percent indicated losses between $50,000 and $200,000,
and an additional 20 percent indicated losses between $200,000 and
$500,000.145
A corporation can take steps to prevent insider computer abuse by
performing background checks on its employees who control access to
sensitive data. 146 Also, when an employee is terminated for any reason,
he should be escorted to his desk while he removes his personal belongings and all security codes must be submitted to the firm. 1 47 Anything

the employee had to do with security (e.g., passcodes, entry to physically
secured locations in the company) should be considered compromised
142. Rustad & Eisenschmidt, supra note 29, at 233 (discussing that parallel processing
may make it possible to crack a 64-digit key).
143. Rustad & Eisenschmidt, supra note 29, at 238. "While encryption seems to be providing a solution to the problem of insecure Internet transactions, many firms are still
failing to take adequate internal security measures to protect against computer security
breaches by their employees." Id.
144. William J. Cook, IndustrialEspionage and the Internet,CmCAGO LAw., Feb. 1997,
at 57-58. "[These findings] are similar to a Michigan State survey in October 1995 of 150
corporate security directors, which revealed that 98.6 percent of their companies had experienced a computer-related crime and that 75 percent to 80 percent of the incidents were
caused by insiders." Id. at 58.
145. Id.
146. See generally Agranoff, supra note 93, at 288. The corporation should incorporate
into its computer security policy that it will perform a background check on anyone it hires
who may have access to sensitive data. Id. It also makes sense to perform background
checks on its existing employees and to annually review its files to make sure no employees
who are in control of sensitive data have not had a background check. Id. The annual
review would close the loophole of an employee who was formerly in a nonsensitive area of
the company from being promoted to a sensitive area of the company without a background
check. Id.
147. Rustad & Eisenschmidt, supra note 29, at 238.

190

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XVI

and all related passcodes or locks should be changed. 148 While this may
seem harsh, it is an effective way to prevent insider computer abuse and
to show the corporation exercised reasonable care in securing its computer network. 149

7. Monitor the Effectiveness of Computer Network Security and
Update Security When Necessary
The corporation has a duty to monitor the effectiveness of its computer security policies, procedures, and infrastructure. 150 Monitoring
computer network access is essential and any attempt to access computer files or programs should be logged 151 for future reference, and 1all
52
suspicious accessing should be reviewed and if necessary, terminated.
For example, if during a computing session, five attempts were made to
access a file and all five attempts were denied, the access control
software could automatically "suspend" the particular user until a system administrator investigates and "unsuspends" that particular
user.153 In addition, the corporation should consider using computer
network security auditing products that provide a great deal of network
security analysis and reporting. 5 4 For example, the Internet Scanner
3.2155 can scan a corporation's computer network and comprehensively
probe for network vulnerability, check for firewall security holes, and
provide suggestions to fix the security holes.' 5 6 The vast array of Internet and computer security devices make it feasible for a corporation to
monitor the effectiveness of its computer security and to update its security when necessary. This is important to demonstrate a corporation has
148. Rustad & Eisenschmidt, supra note 29, at 238.
149. See generally Rustad & Eisenschmidt, supra note 29, at 238. This situation is not
different from days past when after an employee was terminated, he or she was required to
turn in his keys to his file cabinet, office, or other secured location. Id.
150. Massingale & Borthick, supra note 42, at 191.
151. Agranoff, supra note 93, at 294. Logging is defined as:
[Tihe electronic recording of significant ACS [Access Control Software] files activity. Such activity will normally include all access requests which the security system denied such as invalid password attempts, or any valid requests which the
system administrators somehow deemed worthy of inclusion. The purposes of logging are to catch actual malefactors, deter potential malefactors, and provide information for system recovery.
Id.
152. Massingale & Borthick, supra note 42, at 191.
153. Agranoff, supra note 93, at 294.
154. See Michael Surkan, Daemons Defy Hackers: Internet Scanner Best Ferrets Out
Network Security Breaches, PC Wy-, Feb. 5, 1996, at N1.
155. Id. The Internet Security System Inc.'s Internet Scanner 3.2 was rated the best
network security scanner. Id.
156. Id.
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exercised reasonable care in maintaining the security of its computer
network.
C.

AN ILLUSTRATION OF A CAUSE OF ACTION IN NEGLIGENCE FOR A

CORPORATION'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE COMPUTER
NETWORK SECURITY

57

1. The Fact Pattern

A team of hackers has successfully dialed into ABC Corporation, a
medium sized company with $200 million in revenues and ten locations
throughout the United States. The hackers next use ABC's computers
and modems to freely "war dial" 158 until they hack into DEF Corporation's computer systems. ABC did not have a firewall and had easy passwords to crack, otherwise the hackers could not have broken into ABC's
computer systems. However, DEF did have a firewall but the hackers
cracked a critical password to a remote computer in DEFs warehouse
(which was connected to the main warehouse computer that ran DEFs
national product distribution system) by using a hacker dictionary program. 159 Finally, the hackers electronically penetrated DEFs main
warehouse computer and completely disabled it. The combination of
DEFs three days of lost business and the costs of getting its computer
system running again amounted to an alleged total loss of $20 million.
2.

The Negligent Corporation'sLiability

ABC Corporation is liable in negligence to DEF Corporation. 160 According to the minimum corporate computer network security standards
proposed earlier in this comment, 16 1 ABC had a duty to provide ade157. A combination of two true stories into one hypothetical illustrates how a negligence
case can be brought against a corporation that fails to provide adequate security to its
computer network. The two combined stories are from the professional hackers from
WheelGroup Corp. in the introduction of this comment and from the filed complaint of
Revlon, Inc. See Revlon Inc. v. Logisticon Inc., No. 705933 (Cal. Super. Ct., Santa Clara
Cty., complaint filed Oct. 22, 1990). Revlon filed a complaint against a software company
that dialed into Revlon's computer system and disabled it for three days, losing Revlon an
alleged $20 million in revenues. Id.
158. Behar, supra note 1, at 59-60. War dialing is using modems to dial automatically
thousands of phone numbers within a specific range to find other modems to connect with.
Id. Then such connections are used to hack into the attached computer systems. Id.
159. Rustad & Eisenschmidt, supra note 29, at 229. "Hacker dictionary programs operate by trying every word in the dictionary (including variant of words and names) until a
password match is found." Id.
160. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF TORTS § 282 (1965). "[N]egligence is conduct which falls
below the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable
risk of harm." Id.
161. See discussion, supra Part III.B.1-7. The minimum corporate computer network
security standards are: (1) establish and publicize an organizational security policy; (2)
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quate network security so that DEF, a foreseeable plaintiff,1 62 was not
subjected to the unreasonable risk of the hackers' intrusion. 16 3 ABC
breached its duty to provide adequate computer network security by not
having a firewall installed and by not having the proper procedures in
place to prevent use of easy passwords by ABC employees.16 4 The heart
of this cause of action in negligence is the seminal rule on foreseeability
by Justice Cardozo, "the risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty
to be obeyed." 16 5 Foreseeability 16 6 defines the duty 16 7 owed by ABC to
foreseeable plaintiffs, 168 (i.e., DEF Corp.) and computer hacking is
prevent unauthorized access to computer systems; (3) implement administrative security
controls; (4) install firewalls; (5) use encryption technology; (6) protect computer resources
from inside jobs; (7) monitor the effectiveness of computer network security and update
security when necessary. See discussion, supra Part III.B.1-7 [hereinafter Network Security Standards].
162. Massingale & Borthick, supra note 42, at 177. "[A] duty imposes an obligation only
towards those who would be foreseeably endangered and only with respect to those risks or
hazards that are reasonably foreseeable." Id.
163. Massingale & Borthick, supra note 42, at 177. "A duty of care runs only to 'foreseeable plaintiffs,' any person or class of persons who could reasonably be expected to be injured by the system manager's negligence." Id.
164. It is important to note this comment does not propose that a successful hacker
intrusion by itself constitutes a breach of duty. The duty imposed on the corporation is the
failure to provide adequate security measures, not the failure to have hacker-proofsecurity
measures in place. For example, if ABC Corporation had had a firewall installed and could
show that it had adequate procedures in place to prevent unauthorized access by demonstrating that it had employee training classes, etc., then ABC is probably not liable in
negligence.
165. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928).
166. See generally id. "In tort law, the 'foreseeability' element of proximate cause is
established by proof that [the] actor, as [a] person of ordinary intelligence and prudence,
should reasonably have anticipated danger to others created by his negligent act." BLAC's
LAw DICTIONARY 649 (6th ed. 1991).
167. Hartsfield v. McRee Ford, Inc., 893 S.W.2d 148, 150 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995). The
court describing the factors used in determining whether there is a duty:
Imposition of a duty involves several factors, including 'risk, foreseeabiity, and
likelihood of injury weighed against the social utility of the actor's conduct, the
magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury and consequences of placing that burden on the [defendant].' Courts have traditionally considered foreseeability to be the most significant of these factors.
Id. "Theduty of any person is the obligation of due care to refrain from any act which will
cause foreseeable harm to others even though the nature of that harm and the identity of
the harmed person or harmed interest is unknown at the time of the act." A.E. Inv. Corp. v.
Link Builders, Inc., 214 N.W.2d 764, 766 (Wis. 1974).
168. This comment recognizes that the Palsgrafcase represents the proposition that a
foreseeable plaintiff is one who is specifically identifiable at the time of the negligent act's
occurrence. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 41, § 43, at 285. Thus, this comment proposes
to broaden the holding in Palsgrafto include plaintiffs whose identity is not known to the
defendant at the time of the negligent act's occurrence. Such broadening is appropriate
and indeed necessary, because the Internet links people and companies (and creates new
risks) in ways not contemplated by Justice Cardozo in 1928.
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clearly a foreseeable risk a corporation takes when it connects to the Internet or operates a computer network that is susceptible to hacker intrusions because the network is attached to phone lines. 169
DEF Corporation has suffered $20 million in damages. ABC Corporation's inadequate computer network security was the actual cause or
cause-in-fact 170 because if ABC did not have inadequate security, DEF
would not have suffered $20 million in damages. DEFs damages were
also the foreseeable consequence of ABC's unreasonable risk of not having adequate computer network security, and therefore, proximate cause
is shown. 1 7 1 Thus, ABC is liable to DEFin negligence because ABC had
a duty to provide adequate network security, ABC breached that duty by
not having a firewall and by not having procedures in place to prevent
easy passwords from being utilized, and DEFs $20 million in damages
were the foreseeable consequence of ABC's inadequate computer network security.
3.

The Negligent Corporation'sFailedDefense and Counterarguments

ABC can assert the defense of contributory negligence' 72 or assert
the theory of comparative negligence 173 for DEF Corporation's alleged
negligence in failing to provide its own adequate computer network security.174 However, according to the standard of care proposed in this
169. Pamela Samuelson, Can Hackers Be Sued for Damages Caused by Computer Viruses?, Comm. OF THE A.C.M., June 1989, at 666. "[T]he owner of the computing system . . . [hias a duty of care to create reasonable safeguards against unauthorized

access... because the penchant for hackers to seek unauthorized entry is well-known in
the computing community." Id.
170. BLAcK's LAw DicrIONARY 152 (6th ed. 1991). "[T]he injury ... would not have
happened but for the conduct of the wrongdoer." Id.
171. See Stewart v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 1991 WL 88068 1, 2 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1991). "The foreseeability of the act... determines whether there is proximate cause." Id.
"[L]egal cause exists when 'the injury is of a type which a reasonable man would see as a
likely result of his conduct.'" DeMyrick v. Guest Quarters Suite Hotels, 944 F. Supp. 661,
666 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
172. BLAcn's LAW DICTioNARY 716-17 (6th ed. 1991). Contributory negligence is a defense where the plaintiff breaches his duty to protect himself from injury and is a contributing cause of his injury. Id. Contributory negligence is a complete bar to plaintiff's recovery
in only five states: Alabama, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and the District of Columbia. WADE ET AL., supra note 44, at 568.
173. BLAcis LAw DICTIoNARY 193 (6th ed. 1991). Comparative negligence is where the
amount of negligence is measured in terms of percentage and any damage allowed to plaintiff is diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the plaintiff's
conduct. Id.
174. This comment does not discuss the doctrines of joint and several liability, contribution, and assumption of risk because the advent of comparative negligence has significantly
diminished the applicability of these doctrines in most states. See John Scott Hickman,
Note, Efficiency, Fairness,and Common Sense: The Case for One Action as to Percentageof
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comment, 175 DEF probably would not be liable in negligence (i.e., DEF
would not be assigned a proportional percentage of the fault thus reducing ABC's percentage of fault) unless DEF violated the other areas of its
duty to provide adequate computer network security. 176 ABC may also
argue that the criminal act of the hackers was an unforeseeable intervening cause 177 relieving ABC from liability. However, ABC's argument
fails when DEF demonstrates that the hackers' criminal act was foreseeable and that it is anomalous that "[t]he happening of the very event the
likelihood of which makes the actor's conduct negligent and so subjects
178
the actor to liability cannot relieve him from liability."
Alternatively, ABC may argue that its fault should by reduced by
the intentional fault of the hackers. However, this argument should fail
because shifting some of ABC's liability to the hackers would reduce the
incentive for corporations like ABC to provide adequate computer network security.' 79 ABC can pursue reducing its monetary cost of liability
Fault in ComparativeNegligence Jurisdictionsthat Have Abolished or Modified Joint and
Several Liability, 48 VAND. L. REv. 739, 741-42 (1995). The trend has been:
The past decade has seen a marked increase in the number of states that have
either abolished or modified the joint liability rule and replaced it with some form
of comparative fault .... In 1950 only five jurisdictions in the United States applied comparative negligence to most negligence cases. By 1995, forty-six states
had adopted comparative negligence by either legislative or judicial action.
Id (footnotes omitted). "Assumption of risk is not favored by the courts .... [Tihe advent of
comparative negligence is prompting courts to implement a merger of the defenses of contributory negligence and [ I assumption of risk." WADE ET AL., supra note 44, at 594.
175. Network Security Standards, supra note 161.
176. For example, if DEF did not have a firewall installed and did not use encryption
technology, then DEF may be assigned a percentage of the fault. This percentage would
reduce proportionally the percentage of fault attributed to ABC and, thus, reduce ABC's
percentage of liability. Id.
177. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 568 (6th ed. 1991). Intervening cause is "[ain act of an
independent agency which destroys the causal connection between the negligent act of the
defendant and the wrongful injury." Id.
178. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRrs § 449 cmt. b (1965). See also Slawson v. Fast
Food Enters., 671 So.2d 255, 259 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (finding the defendant business
liable for failing to protect a patron from a reasonably foreseeable intentional attack by a
third party. The court stated that "if the reasonable possibility of the intervention, criminal or otherwise, of a third party is the avoidable risk of harm which itself causes one to be
deemed negligent, the occurrence of that very conduct cannot be a superseding cause.");
Cruz v. Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1252, 1257 (Utah 1996) (stating "the
thief's criminal acts, though intervening, do not preclude a finding of proximate cause if the
acts were foreseeable").
179. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. McDonald, 676 So.2d 12, 22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(holding that "allowing [a negligent] tortfeasor to place the blame entirely or largely on the
intentional wrongdoer would serve as a disincentive for the negligent tortfeasor to meet its
duty [of] reasonable care to prevent intentional harm from occurring"). See also Kansas
State Bank & Trust Co. v. Specialized Trans. Serv., Inc., 819 P.2d 587, 606 (Kan. 1991)
(reasoning that negligent tortfeasor should not be allowed to reduce its fault by the intentional fault of another that the negligent tortfeasor had a duty to prevent).
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by directly suing the hackers for trespass to chattel (and DEF also can
assert such action against the hackers).' 0 Nevertheless, ABC's liability
to DEF remains and stems from its failure to provide adequate computer
network security to prevent a foreseeable hacker intrusion that caused
damage to DEF.
IV. CONCLUSION
The use of computers and the Internet is increasing every day. The
current lack of minimum corporate computer network security standards
and the economic loss rule leave injured parties without redress from
hacker intrusions into corporate computer networks. However, this comment has described how tort law has developed in recent years as an
appropriate legal tool to solve computer and Internet related issues.
Tort law helps solve the social problem of computer hacking by deterring
hackers and providing an incentive for corporations to provide adequate
computer network security. Otherwise, the hacker is liable in trespass
and the corporation is liable in negligence, both as remedies available to
the injured party.
This Comment has proposed a minimum standard of care for corporate computer network security. Without a nationally recognized standard of care, an injured party may fail to prove the negligent corporation
had a duty to that injured party. Therefore, a national standard of care
must be adopted either by case law or federal legislation providing corporations an incentive to bolster their computer network security and providing injured parties a remedy. This standard of care will go a long way
in promoting computer security awareness and in preventing the potentially grave risks and consequences associated with using computers and
the Internet.
David L. Gripman

180. Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 468, 473 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (ruling
that a long-distance telephone company victimized by hackers could recover under a theory
of trespass to chattel).

